is mirrored by the absence of serious study of territorial issues and interstate conflict. Most of the existing research on geography and conflict has treated geography as a "facilitating condition for conflict," rather than a "source of conflict" in the sense of contentious issues (Diehl 1991) .
Examples of work on geographic factors as a facilitating condition for conflict include Boulding's (1962) loss of strength gradient and studies of proximity and the initiation, escalation, or spread of war (e.g., Bremer 1992; Diehl 1985; Lemke 1995; Most and Starr 1980; see also Diehl 1991) .
In the present research I study territorial issues as a source of conflict. I briefly review the relevant literature on territorial issues. I then present and test several hypotheses on the effects of territory on interstate conflict. As will be seen, territorial issues produce very different forms of conflict behavior than less salient issues. Confrontations involving territory are more escalatory than non-territorial confrontations, and territorial disputes are also more likely than nonterritorial disputes to be followed by renewed conflict between the same adversaries in the future. In this sense, territorial questions between states can be seen as setting the stage for serious conflict between them, essentially charting a long course of potential conflict if the questions are not resolved quickly and peacefully.
Theoretical Development
A number of scholars' descriptions of interstate conflict processes begin with conflicts of interest between two or more states. Snyder and Diesing's (1977) model of interstate crises, for example, begins with a conflict of interest and mild conflict behavior between the adversaries, potentially developing into a crisis if the two sides should begin to employ more coercive means to pursue their interests. Lebow (1981) offers a model of crisis and war that begins with underlying hostility between the adversaries, which may lead to manifestations of tension and eventually the outbreak of a crisis between them. Holsti (1991) also describes a "peace and war cycle" where contentious issues can generate conflicts between adversaries, possibly leading to war. To each of these scholars, interstate conflict begins with a disagreement over one or more contentious issues.
Contentious issues can involve a wide variety of disagreements. Holsti (1991) , for example, identifies 24 specific types of issues that have produced conflict since 1648, ranging from national unification to supporting an ally to maintaining a balance of power. For the purposes of the present study, though, I focus on territory as an issue that is considered by many scholars and policymakers to be especially salient. 1 Hill (1945: 3) , for example, argued that "International relations, in their more vital aspects, revolve about the possession of territory." Territorial issues have been described as "conspicuous among the causes of war" (Hill 1945: 3) and "perhaps the most important single cause of war between states in the last two or three centuries" (Luard 1970: 7) .
Territory can be seen as important for nation-states for several reasons (e.g., Diehl 1991) . In the most basic sense, territory may be important because of what it contains. Many disputed territories have contained (or have been thought to contain) valuable commodities or resources, such as strategic minerals or oil. A territory may be seen as important because of the population that it contains, particularly when this population includes members of an ethnic or religious group that inhabits a neighboring state. Territory may also be important to states as a way to increase their perceived security by providing advance warning of an impending attack and contributing to national defense, particularly to the extent that the territory in question contains defensible geographic features like rough terrain or mountains.
Territory in this tangible sense contributes to a state's power and security, which are important elements in a realist world view (e.g., Morgenthau 1978) .
Beyond any physical elements that it may contain, territory is also seen as important to states for less tangible reasons. Territory is argued to lie at the heart of national identity and cohesion, with the very existence and autonomy of a state being rooted in its territory (e.g., Murphy 1990: 531) . Similarly, Bowman (1946: 177) argued that there is a "profound psychological difference" between the transfer of territory and other types of interstate interactions or treaties:
Territory is near and plain and evokes personal feelings and group sentiments. To a people conscious of its individuality, "how sweet the silent backward tracings." Such people endow the land itself with a mystical quality, hearing revered ancestors, the authors of past grandeurs and the doers of heroic deeds, speak from their graves in its soil. (...) It is title to sentiments like these, and not merely to so-and-so many square miles of land, that is transferred when there is a change of boundaries and rule.
In short, territory is argued to have "a psychological importance for nations that is quite out of proportion to its intrinsic value, strategic or economic," and territorial disputes seem to arouse sentiments of pride and honor more rapidly and more intensely than any other type of issue (Luard 1970: 7 ; see also Vasquez 1993) . Hastings and Jenkins (1983: 9) demonstrate the symbolic or intangible importance of territory in discussing Argentina's claim to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands:
The islands were of no economic and only limited strategic significance. (...) Nevertheless, all Argentine schools were instructed to teach "The Malvinas are Argentine," a cry which was even set to music. A generation of Argentinians thus grew up regarding the British occupation as an affront to their nationhood. Repossession was not a matter of legal or diplomatic nicety. It was a challenge to national honor. Levy and Vakili (1992: 130-131) note the importance that Argentina's President Galtieri attached to the Malvinas as "a national symbol shared by nearly all segments of society," which made the islands seem to be an ideal tool for increasing the unity and legitimacy of the ruling regime.
After Argentine forces invaded the islands in 1982, the Argentine news media and political parties --even those that had vigorously opposed Galtieri's regime in the past --rallied behind Galtieri in celebrating the end of what La Prensa termed "an intolerable insult to Argentine independence and nationhood" (Lebow 1985: 114 Chamberlain --the traditional "winner" whenever the question was asked --as the worst prime minister, despite the seemingly much lower importance of the Falklands compared to Chamberlain's losses in Central Europe (Lebow 1985: 116-117) .
Other territorial disputes also offer plentiful examples of the symbolic importance of territory (Hensel 1996: Chapter Five) . During the war between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Chaco Boreal territory, Bolivia's minister to the United States (Finot 1934: 23) wrote that "Perhaps if the Chaco dispute has been merely a territorial controversy, Bolivia... might have resigned herself to the loss of her patrimony in order to preserve peace... But the question involved is not only the possession of territories more or less valuable, but also the right to life, the necessity of breathing and of recovering the attributes of an independent and sovereign nation." The Bolivian and Paraguayan media and opposition parties pressured their respective governments to take a firm stance on the Chaco question, criticizing any hint of accommodation that might be seen as surrendering national territory to the enemy (even if these opposition parties had tried to reach similar accommodations while previously in power). Paraguay's National Council of Education even adopted an official textbook with the title The Chaco Boreal Was, Is, and Will Be Paraguayan (Rout 1970; Warren 1949) . Similarly, France and Germany both came to view the disputed territory along the Rhine River as a national symbol or "deity," leading to patriotic literature and songs with lyrics like "they shall not have it, the free German Rhine" (Mann 1968: 43, 72-73) .
Beyond the tangible and intangible reasons that have just been discussed, territory can also be important for reasons of reputation. That is, if a leader gives in to an adversary on territorial issues despite the tangible and intangible importance of the territory, other adversaries might be encouraged to press their own demands on other issues. Huth (1988) and Fearon (1994) , among others, discuss similar notions regarding the impact of reputation on deterrence crises. There is evidence, for example, that reputational considerations affected the British reaction to Argentina's invasion of the Falklands. Lebow (1985: 117-118) notes concerns by the British defense ministry and the Economist about the risks to British interests in Gibraltar, Belize, Guyana, Diego Garcia, Hong Kong, and Antarctica if Britain were to back down over the Falklands. Even if behavior in previous crises against other adversaries may not have much overall impact on deterrence (Huth 1988 ), behavior in crises over such highly salient issues as territory might be expected to produce important reputational effects.
These examples, along with the observations about the tangible and intangible importance of territory that were presented above, suggest a series of implications for the study of interstate conflict. That is, if territorial issues are treated differently from other issues because of their physical or psychological importance, then conflict over territory should be different from conflict over other issues. I now consider some of the ways that territory might be expected to affect interstate conflict behavior, before attempting to test these differences empirically.
Conflict Severity
One important potential impact of contentious issues lies in the severity or escalation level of confrontations.
It has been suggested above that territory is considered to be an especially important type of issue, and that territory has a special psychological dimension that distinguishes it from other issues. Similarly, Vasquez (1993: 133, 151) suggests that territorial issues are unusual among contentious issues in their proneness to violence, with disagreements over territorial issues being more likely than disagreements over other issues to end up in crisis or war. If this is so, then we should expect conflict behavior in disputes over territory to differ from disputes over other types of issues. In particular, we should find that territorial disputes tend to reach higher levels of conflict severity than disputes where policymakers are not pushed by the territorial imperative.
Interstate disagreements over non-territorial issues might not be expected to dominate the relationship between the adversaries to the same extent as territorial disagreements. That is, disagreements over economic relations or treaty ratification do not seem likely to lead to all-out war, and disagreements over the disposition of one state's citizen in another state's prison rarely lead to serious conflict or war. Even when one state threatens to use force to resolve such issues, the resulting disputes would seem likely to end quickly, with little escalation and little perception that war is likely. Neither side in such a confrontation would seem likely to accept the risks and potential costs inherent in violent conflict over issues that are of such low salience for both sides.
Disagreement over territorial stakes, though, might be expected to produce greater levels of conflict and escalation. Policy makers might be expected to be more active in pursuing and protecting their states' vital interests, because the risks or costs of losing the disputed stakes to the enemy might be too great. As Brecher (1993: 153) argues, the more basic the values at stake in a crisis situation, "the higher the cost crisis actors are willing to incur to protect them, and the more extreme will be their crisis management (value-protecting) technique." Given the above suggestions about the importance of territory and the centrality of territorial issues to states and their populations, territory seems to be an extremely important type of stake, and the loss of a piece of territory is likely to be seen as potentially devastating. As a result, leaders are expected to be less likely to ignore escalatory moves by the adversary, and more likely to take escalatory actions of their own in order to protect their territorial interests.
Hypothesis 1:
Militarized disputes involving territorial issues will reach higher severity levels than disputes over other types of issues. Several recent studies have supported similar hypotheses. In a study of conflict behavior in Latin American dyads, Hensel and Diehl (1994) find that militarized disputes involving territorial issues were much more likely to feature a militarized response by the target state than disputes over less salient issues. Gochman and Leng's (1983) study of 30 interstate crises finds that crises involving "vital issues" --i.e., issues of territory or national independence --typically showed higher levels of escalation than crises over less salient issues. Senese (1996) also finds that disputes over territorial issues have typically produced a greater number of fatalities than disputes over other issues.
This study examines two dimensions of dispute escalation, at both the low and high ends of the escalation spectrum. The first dimension involves the target state's response to a militarized challenge by a dispute initiator.
That is, once one state threatens, displays, or uses force in pursuit of its interests, does the target of that action respond with military threats or actions of its own? As Hensel and Diehl (1994) 
Conflict Outcomes
If territorial issues are as important (physically or psychologically) as suggested earlier, then we might expect militarized confrontations to be more likely to end in decisive outcomes when territorial stakes are involved than otherwise, and less likely to end in stalemated or compromise outcomes. In a dispute over territorial issues, I have already suggested that decision-makers should be more likely to employ military means in pursuit of their interests, and less likely to allow an adversary's moves to go unchallenged.
One consequence of this escalatory tendency would be that stalemates should be less likely in disputes over territorial issues, because each side would be more likely to take serious action and less likely to let the matter drop without some resolution (albeit temporary, because --as will be suggested shortly --the resolution of one dispute may lead to the outbreak of another).
If stalemates are expected to be less likely in disputes over territorial issues and if the adversaries are expected to be more likely to push for some type of resolution to the dispute, I also expect that most of these resolutions will involve decisive outcomes (i.e., a victory for one side and a defeat for its adversary) instead of negotiated compromises.
To the extent that territory is seen as a vital part of a nation-state's self-identity or psychological being, as suggested above, leaders would seem to be less likely to be able to reach satisfactory concessionary agreements with their opponents, because of the difficulty of trading away part of the national soul. France and Germany were unwilling to pursue a negotiated settlement over Alsace and Lorraine, for example, and the territory in question changed hands several times through military conquest (a decisive outcome, if only temporary). Although compromise outcomes may be possible or even likely in disputes over less salient issues, such outcomes would seem to be unlikely in disputes over highly salient issues such as territory.
Hypothesis 2: Militarized disputes involving territorial issues will be more likely to end in decisive outcomes and less likely to end in stalemated or compromise outcomes than disputes over other types of issues.
Conflict Recurrence
Dyads that contend over issues with the importance attributed to territory are arguably more likely to become involved in recurrent confrontations in the aftermath than are dyads that contend over less inflammatory issues. If an early confrontation fails to resolve an issue of relatively low salience, the adversaries may be prone to drop the matter entirely without pursuing further conflict over the issue, because the costs and risks of conflict might exceed the value attached to the issues at stake. Such issues may be one-time problems, which might be resolved quickly in a single confrontation, or which might be abandoned without any type of formal resolution if the involved issues are sufficiently unimportant. Where territorial issues are involved, though, the adversaries might be expected to keep pursuing the issue until they have achieved their goals. And when one side manages to achieve its goals over territorial issues, the other side may then have a powerful incentive to try to regain its lost territory and to overcome some of the damage to its national pride or honor, should the opportunity arise in the future. Bowman (1946: 178) , for example, noted that any territorial solution --no matter how fair it may seem --carries with it the risk of future attempts to regain lost territory. Arguments may always be raised in the future about past historical claims to the lost territory, especially in border zones of mixed ethnic or linguistic composition, and subsequent incidents may always be used to re-focus attention on such historical claims. Bowman (1946: 180-181) further suggested that two or more states can often have irreconcilable claims to the same piece of territory, and that in some territorial disputes there may be no logical solution that each side will ever find acceptable. It is thus reasonable to expect that recurrent conflict will be more likely when territorial issues were involved in the dispute.
Hypothesis 3:
Militarized disputes involving territorial issues will be more likely to be followed by recurrent militarized conflict than disputes over other types of issues.
In a study of conflict recurrence in Latin American dyads, Hensel (1994) finds that territorial issues have seemed to make recurrent conflict more likely than other issues; the present study offers an opportunity to examine whether this same relationship holds for the remainder of the world as well. Another factor that Hensel (1994; see also Maoz 1984 , Brecher 1993 finds to be important in the recurrence of militarized conflict involves dispute outcomes.
Specifically, Hensel (1994: 283) suggests that recurrent conflict would be more likely after a stalemate than after either a decisive outcome or a negotiated compromise, because "neither side was able to produce the desired changes in the status quo, neither was defeated and rendered unable or unwilling to mount another serious challenge, and no mutually satisfactory settlement was reached to resolve the two sides' differences." Similarly, Brecher (1993) expects that crises ending in (formal or semi-formal) voluntary compromise agreements are more likely to produce mutual satisfaction in their wake than crises ending in other outcomes, and that crises ending without such agreements are likely to be followed by greater levels of tension and instability between the adversaries.
The effects of outcomes may also be influenced by the issues at stake in a dispute. I suggested above that disputes involving issues of relatively low salience would be less likely to be followed by recurrent conflict than disputes over territorial issues; these differences between issue types may be compounded by certain types of outcomes. Vasquez (1993: 147) agrees, arguing that unless one side is able to achieve an overwhelming victory over the other or the two sides are able to reach a diplomatic accommodation, territorial issues will tend to fester and will often produce long-term adversarial relationships. The possible interaction between the effects of dispute outcomes and contentious issues forms the basis for this study's final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4:
Militarized disputes involving territorial issues will be more likely to be followed by recurrent militarized conflict than disputes over other types of issues, while controlling for the differences between decisive, stalemate, and compromise outcomes.
Research Design

Spatial-Temporal Domain
This study's analyses cover the years 1816-1992, which is the period currently included in the Correlates of War (COW) Project's Militarized Interstate Dispute data set. The basic unit of analysis is the militarized interstate dispute, which is a confrontation that involves the explicit threat, display, or use of militarized force between the regular forces of two or more nation-states (Gochman and Maoz 1984) . 
Methodology
This study's analyses are presented in the form of contingency tables, which offer a cross-tabulation of the issues at stake in a given dispute with the severity, outcome, or aftermath of that dispute. Beyond the tables themselves, these analyses include both a chi-square test statistic and the odds ratio associated with the the proportion of cases in each cell does not change, the X 2 statistic will increase in value, although the strength of the observed relationship has not been altered (Reynolds 1984 ).
The odds ratio offers insight into the "practical" or "theoretical" substantive significance of the results, or the strength of the relationship between two variables, as opposed to the statistical significance measured by the X 2 statistic (Reynolds 1984) . The odds ratio gives us the ratio of the statistical odds of a certain value of the dependent variable, given the value of the independent variable. In this study's analyses, an odds ratio of 1.0 would tells us that the odds of the dependent variable --e.g., dispute escalation to war --are identical for disputes involving territorial issues and disputes involving other types of issues. An odds ratio greater than 1.0 indicates how much greater are the odds of the dependent variable for one value of the independent variable than for the other. For example, the odds ratio of 3.19 found in Table 2 indicates that the odds of escalation to war are over three times as high for disputes involving territorial issues as for disputes involving other issues. The odds ratio is not affected by the number of cases presented in a table, and offers an easily interpretable comparison of the strength of the differences between territorial and other issues in interstate conflict.
Operationalization of Variables Territorial Issues
The recently updated COW Militarized Dispute data set Longer periods of stability reach into times when the next dispute may not be related closely to the previous dispute.
Analyses run without such a cutoff also risk a serious skewing of the results because some disputes in the early nineteenth century have had 150 years or more to be followed by further conflict, while more recent cases have had a much shorter time period in which recurrent conflict could arise. indicates that the odds of a militarized response are nearly three and one-half times greater when territorial issues are at stake than when other types of issues are at stake.
Frequency of Territorial Issues
[ Table 1 about here]
The results presented in Table 1 offer strong support for the importance of territorial issues in interstate conflict. Target states were much more likely to respond by militarized means when provoked militarily in disputes over territorial issues than in disputes over other issues. This result supports my hypothesis, indicating that decisionmakers are much more willing to risk dispute escalation in order to protect their interests on issues of high salience than when less salient issues are at stake. Even if threats over less salient issues can be ignored, the tangible and intangible importance of territory seems to be great enough that a challenge over territorial issues is almost always met with a militarized response.
[ Table 2 about here] The aggregated dispute-level data set (as presented in Table   2 ) includes 80 disputes that escalated to interstate war, or Table 2 do not change substantially when the dyadic disaggregation is used, but the absolute likelihood of dyadic escalation to war would be misleadingly high when compared to the overall proportion of all disputes that escalate to war (as presented here). 9
As Territory thus seems to be seen by leaders as highly salient, justifying the risks of escalation in order to protect or advance one's interests much more than other types of issues.
Another dimension of conflict behavior that should be affected by contention over territorial issues involves the outcome of confrontations, to which we now turn.
[ Table 3 about here] Tables 1 and 2 --the current dispute is becoming too costly. A compromise outcome meant as such a temporary measure could minimize the state's losses in the current confrontation, and might perhaps buy valuable time to help achieve a better outcome in the future. In either of these situations, a compromise outcome would not necessarily reflect a desire to settle the state's long-term territorial questions amicably, and it may actually be meant as a short-term ploy to end one confrontation while planning or preparing for another. Goertz and Diehl (1992) suggest that territorial changes occurring by treaty may be seen as less legitimate than changes that occur through other means, for similar reasons.
Conflict Outcomes
The results from Tables 1 through 3 suggest that contention over territory affects both the outcome and escalation level of a confrontation between states. As hypothesized earlier, disputes involving territorial issues were significantly less likely to end in stalemates than disputes over other issues, and significantly more likely to end in decisive outcomes. In combination with the results presented above for dispute escalation, then, it seems clear that contention over territorial issues is significantly different from contention over other types of issues. The next question to be dealt with involves the impact of contentious issues on subsequent relations between two adversaries --i.e., beyond affecting the severity and outcome of one confrontation, do the issues at stake affect the likelihood of future conflict between the same states?
[ Table 4 about here] Table 4 presents an analysis of conflict recurrence after disputes over territorial and non-territorial issues.
Conflict Recurrence
Regardless of the type of issues involved, over half of all militarized disputes --1859 of 3043, or 61.1 percent --are followed by another dispute between the same adversaries within fifteen years. Nonetheless, the issues at stake in a confrontation also make a substantial difference in the likelihood of recurrent conflict. When territorial issues are at stake, nearly three-fourths of all disputes are followed quickly by another dispute (567 of 795, or 71.3 percent), as compared to 1292 of 2248 disputes over nonterritorial issues (57.5 percent). This difference is statistically significant (X 2 = 47.38, 1 d.f., p < .001), and the odds ratio of 1.84 indicates that the odds of a recurrent dispute are nearly twice as great for disputes involving territorial issues. These results from Table 4 offer further support for the important impact of contentious issues on conflict behavior. A oneway ANOVA also revealed that the next militarized dispute tends to happen sooner after a dispute over territorial issues than after a non-territorial dispute, with territorial issues producing almost two years less "stability" before the outbreak of the next dispute than other types of issues (5.56 years versus 7.22; F = 39.85, p < .001). 10
The final set of analyses expands on the relationship between contentious issues and dispute recurrence by adding in the effects of dispute outcomes. Both territorial and non-territorial disputes produce similar relationships between outcomes and recurrence, and both effects are statistically significant (X 2 = 66.25, 2 d.f., p < .001 for territorial issues; X 2 = 111.45, 2 d.f., p < .001 for nonterritorial issues). For both territorial and nonterritorial issues, stalemated outcomes are the most likely to produce recurrent conflict in their aftermath, followed by compromises and decisive outcomes.
[ Table 5 about here]
Nonetheless, there are important differences between territorial and non-territorial issues, as revealed in Table   5 . In particular, for each type of outcome, disputes over territorial issues are more likely to be followed by recurrent conflict than disputes over other issues that ended in the same type of outcome. These differences are most notable after decisive outcomes, where the likelihood of recurrence increases from 36.2 percent to 52.8 percent when territorial issues are involved, and stalemates, where the likelihood of recurrence jumps from 65.9 percent to 82.7 percent. These differences between territorial and nonterritorial disputes with the same outcome are statistically significant at the .001 level for both stalemates and decisive outcomes in Table 5 , and the odds ratios indicate that the odds of recurrence after each of these outcomes are roughly twice as great when territorial issues were at stake.
Compromises produce very little change when territorial issues are involved; the likelihood of recurrence only increases from 57.6 percent to 65.2 percent, which is not statistically significant (p < .31) and which produces a relatively low contingent odds ratio of 1.38. Nonetheless, compromises see a somewhat higher likelihood of recurrence when territorial issues are involved than when the adversaries are contending over non-territorial issues, even if the differences are not great.
Tables 4 and 5 suggest that both contentious issues and dispute outcomes exert important influences on relations between adversaries in the aftermath of a confrontation. The differences between decisive outcomes, stalemates, and compromises that have been identified by earlier studies (e.g., Hensel 1994) hold up for both territorial and nonterritorial issues. Similarly, for each type of outcome the likelihood of recurrence is greater for disputes over territorial issues than for disputes over other issues, particularly for decisive and stalemated outcomes. Future conflict is almost assured after a stalemate over territorial issues, and even decisive and compromise outcomes are followed by recurrent conflict over half the time when territory was involved --although the latter two outcome types are more effective at avoiding recurrence when nonterritorial stakes are involved.
Conclusions and Implications
Even though territorial issues account for the primary issues at stake in under one-third of all interstate disputes in the past two centuries, they have been shown to exert an important impact on conflict behavior. Adversaries engaged in a confrontation over territorial issues have been shown to behave much differently from adversaries engaged in confrontations over other types of issues. For example, disputes over territorial issues were shown to be much more escalatory than non-territorial disputes. Territorial disputes were less than half as likely to see non-militarized responses by the target state, with under one-fourth of all targets responding without military means, compared to half of all target states in disputes over non-territorial issues.
Similarly, territorial disputes were nearly twice as likely to escalate to the level of full-scale interstate war.
Disputes over territory were also much more likely to end in compromise or --particularly --decisive outcomes than were non-territorial disputes, and were found to be much less likely to end in stalemates.
These findings suggest some serious implications for future studies of interstate conflict. The empirical importance of territorial issues in this chapter and other studies suggests that many studies of interstate conflict could benefit by incorporating the effects of contentious issues. Including the effects of territorial issues helped Gochman and Leng (1983) , Hensel and Diehl (1994 to account for the escalation of crises, the likelihood of non-militarized response in militarized disputes, and the recurrence of conflict. Even though these studies did not focus exclusively on territory, incorporating the effects of territorial issues helped to strengthen their findings and to increase their resulting understanding of the phenomena being studied. This study's findings also offer some direction in the question of whether contiguity or contention over territorial issues is largely responsible for conflict between neighbors (Vasquez 1995) . Few studies have been able to examine the impact of territorial issues directly, so most research in this area has been forced to draw inferences from the occurrence of conflict between bordering states --some of which involves territorial issues, and some of which does not. The findings of the present study suggest that territorial issues do seem to make a great deal of differences in conflict behavior, beyond the effect of contiguity. Using a distinction between territorial disputes (some of which involved non-contiguous adversaries) and nonterritorial disputes (some of which involved contiguous adversaries), the present study identifies substantial differences in patterns of conflict escalation and recurrence. We would not expect to find such striking differences between territorial and non-territorial disputes if contiguity, rather than territorial issues, were largely responsible for militarized dispute escalation or recurrence.
Additionally, this study's findings --along with those of other recent work on territory and territorial claims --suggest that further work should be devoted to contentious issues such as territory. The studies of Kocs (1995) and Huth (1996) suggest that unresolved territorial claims are a fairly common feature in the interstate system, and that states with competing claims are more likely than other states to become involved in militarized disputes or wars.
The present study and Senese (1996) also suggest that confrontations involving territorial issues tend to be more escalatory than confrontations over other issues, as well as being more likely to be followed by recurrent conflict between the same adversaries. Given this greater escalation and greater likelihood of conflict recurrence, then, it would seem especially important to understand how territorial claims lead to conflict over territorial issues --and to attempt to manage or prevent such confrontations if at all possible.
One important direction for future research involves the study of how territorial issues lead to the initial outbreak of militarized conflict, beyond the effect of territory on conflict escalation or recurrence. That is, following the example of Huth (1996) , it would be useful to study the differences between states that turn to militarized means to resolve their territorial differences and states that are able to manage their territorial questions peacefully. Huth has assembled a valuable data set for studying such questions in the post-World War II era, identifying 129 cases of territorial claims. He finds that around half of these 129
cases saw the outbreak of militarized conflict at least once between 1950-1990, featuring aggressive diplomatic and political behavior in 32 percent of those years and militarized confrontations in about eleven percent (Huth 1996: 103, 106) . It would be useful to extend the collection and analysis of territorial claims data to a longer time frame, perhaps going back to the traditional starting point for most empirical work on world politics in 1816, which would allow us to study the impact of territorial questions over a longer historical period.
Research on territorial issues could also be improved by developing a finer distinction between different territorial issues. Empirical research on territory has tended to treat all territorial issues as similar, focusing on the distinction between territorial and other issues but overlooking differences between different types of territorial claims. It is doubtful that all territorial issues are equally salient, and it is not even certain that each side in a single territorial dispute views the dispute as equally salient. Goertz and Diehl (1992) and Huth (1996) make some progress along these lines, distinguishing between different territorial claims or territorial exchanges on the basis of the size, population, economic value, and location of the involved territory. Future research could benefit from the identification of additional components of territorial salience, as well as from the collection of data on these factors for a larger set of cases (beyond those cases where territory actually changed hands, as with Goertz and Diehl, or the past fifty years as in Huth's work).
Another useful extension of research on contentious issues and interstate conflict would involve the collection of data on additional types of issues separating states.
Most of the existing work on issues has focused on territorial issues, as with the present study, Goertz and Diehl (1992) , Kocs (1995) , Senese (1996) , and Huth (1996) .
Research on contentious issues could benefit from the identification and study of other types of issues, as well, which could greatly increase our understanding of the general role of issues in world politics. It may prove to be difficult or impossible to construct a single scale of issue salience that would be meaningful for most (or all) issue types and spatial-temporal domains (Diehl 1992: 341-342 ), but any movement in this direction would represent a potential improvement in the study and understanding of conflict processes.
With regard to policy implications, this study's findings also suggest that statesmen need to be careful in their dealings with each other over territorial issues.
Confrontations over territorial issues were found to be more escalatory than confrontations over less salient issues.
Disputes involving territory were also found to be more likely than other types of disputes to be followed by renewed conflict between the same adversaries in the future.
Policymakers must exercise special caution in their dealings with adversaries over territorial questions, both to manage their confrontations short of escalation to war and to avoid becoming trapped in lengthy strings of recurrent confrontations afterward.
As suggested earlier, territory is an important element of states' identity and cohesion. For this reason, leaders may see territorial issues as a useful way to try to rally domestic support in times of political or economic trouble.
Nonetheless, the high salience of territorial issues to both participants in a territorial dispute makes this is a very dangerous path to tread. As noted earlier, Argentine Huth (1996) , should attempt to understand the factors that lead some territorial questions to violence while others are resolved peacefully.
Successful management of territorial issues may be a difficult proposition, as shown by the effects of territorial contention on escalation and conflict recurrence, but it is certainly possible. Vasquez (1993: 150-151) and Huth (1996: 189-192) offer some suggestions about how territorial disputes might be resolved or managed, ranging from the deterritorialization of disputes or the conclusion of explicitly defined diplomatic settlements of territorial questions to preventive diplomacy or intervention by external actors. As Vasquez (1993: 146-152) argues, territorial conflict need not continue for the entire relationship of two states, and former adversaries can learn to live with each other peacefully once their territorial concerns have been resolved. It is to be hoped that further scholarly research will be able to help increase our understanding of how territorial differences can be settled peacefully, and that future policymakers will be able to apply this understanding when they deal with potentially explosive territorial issues. Odds Ratio = 1.38 Footnotes 1 Many of Holsti's specific issue types can be combined into similar categories, in order to simplify analysis. For example, territorial issues are directly involved in Holsti's issues of "territory," "strategic territory," "territory (boundary)," as well as more indirectly in his issues of "national unification / consolidation," "secession / state creation," "empire creation," "commerce / navigation," "commerce / resources," and perhaps others.
2 The militarized dispute data set, as currently distributed, is not organized dyadically; rather, it is organized by the entire dispute and by the individual actor in the dispute. To achieve the dyadic breakdown I matched up each actor on side A of each dispute with each actor on side B of the same dispute. I then discarded those dyadic adversaries that could not have confronted each other in the dispute because their dates of participation did not overlap or because they both had a "level of hostility" score of one, which indicates that neither side initiated any militarized action in the dispute (and is thus a participant only because it was the target of another state's militarized action). Further details about this dyadic breakdown procedure are available from the author.
over the same issues. As long as at least one of the participants on either side of a dispute sought changes in the territorial status quo, the dispute is coded as involving territorial issues, but not every dyad involved in that dispute necessarily involved territorial issues as well.
8 Additional analysis reveals that this difference does not depend on the nature of my dyadic disaggregation of the militarized dispute data. Using the aggregated dispute-level data, 31.3 percent of disputes over territorial issues involve non-militarized responses by the target side of the dispute, whether this includes only one state or several. Nonmilitarized response remains over twice as likely using this aggregated data, with 61.3 percent of all disputes over non-territorial issues involving non-militarized responses; the difference also remains highly significant (X 2 = 150.78, 1 d.f., p < .001).
9 Using the dyadic data instead of the aggregated data presented in Table 3 , 17.1 percent of all disputes involving territorial issues escalate to war, as compared to 9.2 percent of all non-territorial disputes. The likelihood of escalation thus remains substantially higher when territorial issues are involved, and these results remain highly significant (X 2 = 36.64, 1 d.f., p < .001).
10 Post-dispute "stability" is the time (in years) elapsed between the end of one dispute and the outbreak of the next dispute between the same two adversaries (Maoz 1984 , Hensel 1994 . As with the analysis of dispute recurrence, I limit this analysis to a maximum stability period of fifteen years. For those right-censored cases where this study's temporal domain ends (at the conclusion of 1992) without the outbreak of renewed conflict, but with less than fifteen years of stability, post-dispute stability is measured as lasting through 1992. I ran separate analyses while leaving out these cases, in order to see whether these cases affected the overall results, but there was no appreciable change in the results without these cases.
